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The ICTY Trials and Transitional Justice
in Former Yugoslavia
Nataga Kandik
If attempts at rewriting history, such as the denial in Germany of the
Holocaust, are to be prevented, the courts must do everything possible to
bring out the truth. In this context, one of the tasks for the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is to put an end to the
practice of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia of passing over in
silence or denying atrocities, or persistently broadcasting their distorted
and biased versions of the past-versions that focus exclusively on their
own victims and the crimes of the other side.
The Tribunal has, without doubt, managed to carry out one part of
this task-establishing the responsibility of the accused individuals-leav-
ing us a legacy of the truth as an ineradicable memory and a potent
weapon against denial. One of the hardest truths was the genocide against
the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica. A Bosnian Serb, General Krstit, and a
number of his close associates, senior officers of the Bosnian Serb army,
were found guilty and sentenced for this crime.' However, the truth dis-
closed at The Hague had no effect in the region of the former Yugoslavia
until it was acknowledged by Republika Srpska.
When the Tribunal handed down its judgment against General Krstit,
reinforced by the guilty pleas of ranking Bosnian Serb military officers who
worked closely with General Mladit and Krstit himself,2 it was received in
Republika Srpska as yet more confirmation of the anti-Serb stance of the
Tribunal. Then the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina ordered the
formation of a Republika Srpska government Commission of Inquiry. In
September 2002, the Republika Srpska issued a report in which it mini-
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1. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, 2001 WL 34712271, Judgment (Aug.
02, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialC1/judgement/krs-tjOI08
02e.pdf (ICTY trial chamber); Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, 2004 WL
2781931, Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/Appeal/
judgement/krs-aj040419e.pdf (ICTY appeals chamber).
2. Prosecutor v. Mladic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-1, 2002 WL 32654857, Amended
Indictment (Oct. 10, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/
mla-ai021010e.htm; see also ICTY, Persons Publicly Indicted by the ICTY for War
Crimes, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/ENGLISH.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).
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mized the crime in Srebrenica by laying emphasis on crimes against
Serbs.3 According to this report, Muslims continuously committed crimes
against the Serbs in Srebrenica municipality from 1992 to 1995, forcing
Serbs to take military action in July, 1995. 4 The report went on to claim
that over 7,000 armed Muslims had fled into the woods and were killed in
combat with Bosnian Serb army forces.5
Under strong pressure by the High Representative and fearing sanc-
tions and isolation, the Republika Srpska government was forced to with-
draw the report and set up a new commission with a mandate to determine
exactly what happened in and around Srebrenica during the period of July
11th to July 19th, 1995. In June 2004, the Commission, which included
Bosnian Muslim members nominated by the High Representative, brought
out a report in which it admitted responsibility for the liquidation of 7,800
Bosnian Muslims. 6 Although the Bosnian Muslims saw this admission as
coerced and insincere and the Bosnian Serbs viewed it as another manifes-
tation of pressure and unfairness, the report is the first official truth
brought out by a government in the region of the former Yugoslavia. Even
if the Republika Srpska government's acknowledgment was the result of
pressure, it has the stamp of the official truth and as such cannot be erased
or replaced by some other truth. It should be noted, however, that neither
the ICTY's genocide judgment nor the Republika Srpska's government
report have created the potential for other instruments of transitional jus-
tice. This is amply illustrated by the fact that there has so far been only
one war crimes trial in Republika Srpska, which closed recently with the
acquittal of Serb police accused of murdering Muslim civilians. 7
In connection with the prospects for transitional justice in the former
Yugoslavia, I would also mention the trial of former Yugoslav president
Slobodan Milogevit at The Hague. Milo~evit is accused of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide.8 His trial is being carried by tele-
3. BUREAU OF GOVERNMENT OF RS FOR RELATION WITH ICTY, REPORT ABOUT CASE
SREBRENICA (FIRST PART) (2002), available at http://www.domovina.net/srebrenica/page-
006/2002_srebrenica.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. THE COMMISSION FOR INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENTS IN AND AROUND SREBRENICA
BETWEEN 10TH AND 19TH JULY 1995, ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT OF THE 11TH JUNE 2004 ON
THE EVENTS IN AND AROUND SREBRENICA BETWEEN 10TH AND 19TH JULY 1995 (2004), http:/
/www.vladars.net/pdf/srebrjfinal-e.pdf (Final Report); see also THE COMMISSION FOR
INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENTS IN AND ABOUND SREBRENICA BETWEEN 10TH AND 19TH JULY
1995, THE EVENTS IN AND AROUND SREBRENICA BETWEEN 10TH AND 19TH JULY 1995 (2004),
http://www.domovina.net/srebrenica/page 006/0406 rsgovernment.pdf (Initial
Report); Nicholas Wood, Bosnian Serbs Admit Responsibility for the Massacre of 7,000,
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004, at A2.
7. Gordana Katana, Bosnia: Shock at War Crimes Acquittal, INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND
PEACE REPORTING, TRIBUNAL UPDATE, Feb. 18, 2005, http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?
archive/tri/tri 394 leng.txt.
8. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, 2001 WL 34656228, Second
Amended Indictment (Oct. 29, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/
english/mil-2ai011029e.htm (Kosovo); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T,
2004 WL 2186254, Order on the Amended Bosnia Indictment (Apr. 21, 2004), available
at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ai04421-e.htm (Bosnia); Prosecutor
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vision stations in Serbia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the prosecution
presented its evidence, Milo~evik acted as if he were prosecuting the inter-
national community and was a witness for the prosecution, and did not
defend himself from the charges against him. Making it clear that he did
not recognize the legitimacy of the tribunal, the judges and the prosecutors,
Milogevie used all the time he had at his disposal to speak about the crimes
others committed against Serbs. And when the time came for him to pre-
sent his own evidence, he chose to relive the time of this rule.
Milogevit has turned his trial into a retrospective of his political bat-
tles against conspiracies and injustice. He and his witnesses-academics,
historians, philosophers and senior officials of his government-are using
the trial as a forum for the promotion of the opinions and views that ele-
vated Miloevi to the leadership. They pay no heed to the prosecution's
evidence on mass murders and plans for the expulsion of non-Serbs for the
sake of grabbing territory, as if all of that had nothing to do with them.
Instead, they are carrying out their "joint enterprise" to convince present-
day Serbia that everything is just as it was ten or more years ago, and that
this is the history the Serb people should remember. It is a fact that politi-
cal parties and elites that share Milogevit's views are in power in Serbia
today, and are helping and encouraging him to present his defense as the
official history of Serbia's past. He has at his disposal 150 days, more than
enough time to convince Serbia that he is the winner.
It appears the Prosecutor's Office is aware that Milogevit's defense,
with its biased interpretation of the past and witness testimony that charac-
terizes the Croats, Muslims, and Albanians as Serbia's enemies throughout
history, is harming all efforts to have the truth and the need for justice
accepted in Serbia as the principles for successful transition. Hence, the
prosecution moved on 6 January of this year for the Trial Chamber to view
the defense being presented by the accused in the context of the existence
of the broader audience following the trial and consider whether there are
public policy reasons for imposing some restraints on the degree to which
defense witnesses are being allowed free rein with their characterizations. 9
I have every confidence that the Trial Chamber will make the right
decision and set some limits on Milogevit's attempts to propagandize his
version of the truth. But, with the freedom he has enjoyed in presenting his
evidence, Milogevie has already been able to revive the past in Serbia, and
indictees are once again being hailed as heroes.
v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, 2004 WL 3370623, Order Modifying Second Order
Granting Leave to Amend the Croatia Indictment (July 28, 2004), available at http://
www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/nil-2ai020728e.htm (Croatia).
9. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, 2005 WL 736002, Order on
Admission of Documents (including Exhibits of Witnesses Kosta Mihajlovic and
Cedomir Popov) and Decision on Prosecution Motion Regarding Exhibits and Other
Practicalities during the Defense Case, (Feb. 7, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/
icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/050207.htm (Note: This is the decision on the Prosecu-
tion's motion of Jan. 6, 2005. Motions are generally published on the ICTY page but not
updated past 2004.).
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Therefore, every attempt to raise the issue of responsibility for the
crimes of the recent past should be welcomed. Notable in this context are
the setting up in Serbia of the Special War Crimes Prosecutor's Office and
the first trial to prosecute war crimes against Croatian prisoners of war, 10
which is being conducted impartially and with great concern for the vic-
tims. Also noteworthy are the persistent demands by non-governmental
organizations that the government establish a commission of inquiry into
the mass graves and the destruction of evidence by burning the bodies of
victims. These measures could contribute significantly to a clean break
with the past and promote the principles of truth and justice.
10. See Dealing with the Past: Ovcara 20 November 1991, HLC NEWSLETTER (Humani-
tarian Law Center, Belgrade, Serbia, and Monte Negro), Nov. 1, 2004, at 1, available at
http://www.hlc.org.yu/storage/docs/elc411bfd5ef4c5lfl7 lb9c730ef52fb.pdf. (HLC
Newsletter No. 3).
